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What can we learn from international
comparisons of health systems and health
system reform?
Barbara McPake1 & Anne Mills2
Most commonly, lessons derived from comparisons of international health sector reform can only be generalized in a
limited way to similar countries. However, there is little guidance as to what constitutes ‘‘similarity’’ in this respect. We
propose that a framework for assessing similarity could be derived from the performance of individual policies in
different contexts, and from the cause and effect processes related to the policies. We demonstrate this process by
considering research evidence in the ‘‘public–private mix’’, and propose variables for an initial framework that we
believe determine private involvement in the public health sector. The most influential model of public leadership
places the private role in a contracting framework. Research in countries that have adopted this model suggests an
additional list of variables to add to the framework. The variables can be grouped under the headings ‘‘demand
factors’’, ‘‘supply factors’’, and ‘‘strength of the public sector’’. These illustrate the nature of a framework that could
emerge, and which would help countries aiming to learn from international experience.
Keywords: comparative study; contract services, case studies; health care reform; cross-cultural comparison;
outcome and process assessment (health care).
Voir page 818 le re´sume´ en franc¸ais. En la pa´gina 819 figura un resumen en espan˜ol.
Introduction
According to Rose (1), ‘‘lesson drawing’’ in public
policy starts with a commonly experienced problem
that forces policy-makers to depart from routine and
search for answers. The process of lesson drawing
involves the following: searching elsewhere, devel-
oping a model of how a programme operates,
devising a new programme and prospectively
evaluating transfer. International comparative re-
search on health system reform aims to contribute to
this process by doing the following:
– describing and clarifying problems, and determin-
ing the extent to which they are commonly
experienced in more than one country;
– identifying the range of approaches used in
different countries to address problems;
– developing a theoretical model of how an
intervention reduces a problem;
– testing the model in different countries and
understanding how the contexts of individual
countries affect performance of the model;
– revising the model in light of the tests;
– retrospectively evaluating the transfer of the
model to other settings.
Both Rose (1) andMarmor (2) identify two fallacies in
discussions of international health comparisons.
. The search for a single best model, for example in
health sector finance. This overlooks the impor-
tance of context — the best model in one setting
need not be so in another.
. The belief that nothing can be learned from other
contexts, because differences in context are always
crucial.
In contrast, both Rose and Marmor argue that the
range of conclusions from international health
comparisons can be generalized to different degrees.
We would place this view in the framework of Fig. 1.
There are two extremes of conclusions in this model
— the generalizable and the specific.
We propose a third category of conclusions
capable of limited generalization to ‘‘more similar’’
countries. However, categorization of countries into
‘‘more similar’’ and ‘‘less similar’’ groups requires a
considered and empirically informed process, which
we refer to as a ‘‘framework’’ for international
comparisons of health systems.
Such a framework can be constructed by
developing, testing and revising models of cause and
effect in health policy, and particularly by prospec-
tively evaluating policy transfer. Frameworks may be
developed for a number of individual policies, but it is
likely that individual frameworks will substantially
overlap, and after a series of policy measures have
been considered few new lessons will emerge as
novel individual policies are assessed. However, this
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view can only be assessed at the conclusion of the
process we propose here. Understanding the impact
individual policies have in different contexts would
allow future policies to be set in context and be
identified as determinant. Thus the process may
prove capable of assessing policy interdependence as
well as the dependence of policy on the exogenous
context.
In this article, we explore the functions of
comparative research in health system reform by
developing a framework for comparing international
health systems, using as an example research on the
public–private mix for health care.
Public–private mix in health care:
development of the debate
Arguments over the merits of private versus public
health systems go back at least to the 1960s, when
Lees (3) argued that health care ‘‘would appear to
have no characteristics which differentiate it sharply
from other goods in themarket’’ and hence should be
provided through market mechanisms. By the 1980s,
Lees’ arguments for privatizing health systems were
reflected in publications of theWorld Bank and in the
views of commentators on health systems in less
developed countries (LDCs), who largely derived
their views and ideologies from the western side of
the Atlantic (4–8). The promoters of more private
systems, such as found in the USA, emphasized the
value of competition and the stronger incentives for
efficient performance that are associated with private
institutional forms. On the other hand, promoters of
more public systems, such as those found in the
United Kingdom, emphasized the ‘‘market failures’’
implicit in health markets (e.g. 9) and the inappropri-
ateness of applying generalizations from other
sectors (10).
This debate was largely terminated by Culyer’s
demonstration that the question of which health
system was better could only be decided using
empirical evidence (11). Despite this, and although a
common problem had been identified (poorly
performing health systems in LDCs) and a model
had been proposed (private financing of health
systems improves performance through incentives
and competition), most commentators did not
research and evidence the ‘‘initial model’’ but seemed
to consider its operation to be self-evident.
Role of private providers in developing
countries: recent research and debate
Initial research efforts on the public–private mix for
health care in LDCs began to take place in the early
1990s. These efforts took the international compara-
tive research process forward to the stage of testing the
theoretical model with experiences in different
countries. Evidence from these efforts indicated that
private provisioning and financing already played a
much greater role in health care than was suggested by
the typical characterizations of LDC health systems as
being dominated by the public sector. Even in
countries with very low levels of private sector
provision, individuals’ out-of-pocket payment for
health services often exceed one-third of the national
health expenditure (12). The evidence also suggested
that the private sector was not used exclusively by
upper-income groups. Rather, a range of private
providers catered for different socioeconomic groups,
Fig. 1. The role of a framework for international comparisons of health systems
Special Theme – Health Systems
812 Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2000, 78 (6)
from unqualified ‘‘quacks’’ and drug sellers operating
in poor rural and urban areas (13–15), towell-equipped
hospitals in richer urban areas.
While it might appear that the performance of
private providers was superior (for example, in
meeting ‘‘felt need’’ or preferences), evidence of
market failures abounded, particularly because of
information asymmetry — the relative lack of
technical knowledge among consumers. Private-
for-profit providers seldom offered services of a
public health nature, even services such as immuni-
zation. Such providers over-prescribe in general, but
especially antibiotics and injectables, which are
understood to be over-valued by patients from a
technical perspective (16, 17). Also in countries
where private involvement in hospital provision is
extensive, unnecessary technology was often
adopted (18). Furthermore, competition could not
be relied upon to effectively discipline private sector
health providers, even by imposing pressures for
efficient production of services deemed most
valuable by the population. In many LDC markets
competition and even ‘‘contestability’’ are absent
(19); and information asymmetry allows inefficient
forms of competition to arise, such as ‘‘quality
signalling’’ (20).
McPake argued several years ago that issues
related to the role of private health providers varied
according to two important dimensions that predicted
the level and form of private health sector develop-
ment (21). The first of these was the level of economic
development, and within the group of countries
generally included on the LDC list there were
important distinctions between the very poor and
the transitional, or middle-income, nations. This
dimension is likely to function as a proxy for a number
of characteristics that might better be considered
separately: income levels; size of the middle class; the
public sector care package; the capacity of the public
sector to regulate, monitor and negotiate with the
private sector; level of private (non-health sector)
development; and education levels.
The second dimension was population density.
Higher population densities are indicative of a more
developed private sector because large numbers of
even very poor people can provide a sufficientmarket
for certain types of private sector providers. A good
example of this can be seen in the proliferation of
private doctors in the Karachi kachi-abadis (urban
slums) (22).
We now propose other important country and
health sector characteristics. First, human resource
development policy has a crucial influence on the
supply side of the market. An excess supply of
doctors may have been key in producing the
proliferation of doctors in the Karachi slums, and
this situation also exists elsewhere in the subconti-
nent; for example, in India (23). Second, institutional
structures in the health sector have historical
determinants unrelated to current development
dynamics, although it may be difficult to isolate these
structures purely as cause since they are also in part
effect. For example, the institutional structures in
countries with similar income, population and
development (e.g. Bolivia and Coˆte d’Ivoire) have
been moulded by different colonial legacies and
cultural influences. In Bolivia, the institutional
structure is tripartite and involves large public, social
security, and private subsectors. In Coˆte d’Ivoire it is
dominated by the public sector with only small-scale
private sector activity (which nevertheless accounts
for a substantial share of health expenditure). These
differences alone seem to create differences in issues
surrounding the role of private providers. Indeed,
historical factors powerfully influence current struc-
tures and arrangements, as well as the extent to which
they can be readily changed by deliberate policy (24),
a phenomenon termed ‘‘path dependence’’ (25). In
other words, institutions change only gradually, not
least because of the power structures and personal
relationships they embody.
Private sector participation in a
public health sector framework
Despite differences in specific public–private issues,
there is one common conclusion: although the private
sector can complement public health provision and
provide some types of services better, it cannot lead
the health sector in a direction likely to maximize its
contribution to the health of the population. This can
be seen both in the role of private drug sellers in rural
Ugandan villages and in that of exclusive private
hospitals in Bangkok. Recognition of the need for
public-interest, rather than profit-oriented, leadership
in the health sector led to increased interest in a revised
model for LDCs, that was already implicit in some
industrialized country reforms (e.g. in Sweden and the
United Kingdom).
According to the revised model, private
providers and competitive pressures play a role
within a guiding framework imposed by public health
authorities. The guiding framework could take the
formof regulation, but research has shown regulatory
influence to be weak in most LDCs (26, 27). This
model has an overlapping rationale with that of the
initial model proposed by Lees (3). However, it
emphasises the value of competition and the
incentive structures of private organizations as spurs
to good performance, while recognizing the need for
a public role in resource allocation.
An alternative version of the revised model
proposed that gains from improved management
could be obtained within a contracting framework,
without introducing either competitive pressures or
private sector organizations. In addition, it has been
argued that using contracts between funders and
providers — even when both are public and there is
no competition — allows funders to distance
themselves from providers and focus instead on
resource allocation. Consequently, it is argued that
the contract is in itself a useful tool for changing the
behaviour of providers (28).
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There are therefore three overlapping rationales
for introducing contract-based models: the value of
competition and the incentive structures associated
with private organizations; the importance of a publicly
set guiding framework for resource allocation; and the
belief that the contracting process is sufficient to
induce performance improvements by itself. Reforms
in a few countries have led to the almost wholesale
adoption of contract-based models within a publicly
set framework (e.g. Colombia andZambia). Andmany
other countries have plans for increasing contractual
relationships, both within the public sector and
between public and private sectors (29).
International comparative research is begin-
ning to permit tentative conclusions to be drawn
about the model’s performance. In practice, how-
ever, it appears difficult to achieve the theoretical
advantages of the contract model. The difficulties
vary according to a range of health sector and other
characteristics, many of which are correlated with a
country’s level of development. This can be seen by
comparing three countries that adopted a more
wholesale version of the model (Colombia, the
United Kingdom, and Zambia), as well as from a
review of the contractual relationships between
public and private sectors for support services, such
as catering and cleaning, in five Asian and African
countries.
Transforming integrated health
systems into contracting health systems:
experiences in three countries
United Kingdom. In 1991 in the United Kingdom, a
‘‘purchaser–provider split’’ was introduced into an
archetypal public integrated model. The main
rationales appear to have been the creation of
competition between hospitals and the development
of a public purchasing role independent of providers.
The expectations of the public purchasing role
exemplify the arguments of the ‘‘revised’’ model.
Public purchasers would be able to identify the needs
of the population and distribute resources accord-
ingly, in contrast to pure private markets.
In contradiction of the ‘‘natural monopoly’’
argument (30), a 1997 study found that competition
was far from absent in much of the United Kingdom
hospitalmarket (31). However, political decisions still
impeded competitive forces. For example, in Lon-
don, where the need for hospital closure had been
long recognized, political mandate rather thanmarket
forces determined which hospitals would close (32,
33). A second constraint to competitive forces arose
from the demand side of the market. For example, it
might be expected that a monopsony would
strengthen public purchasers. However, in practice
it caused conflict between seeking ‘‘best value’’
services in the short term, and protecting the long-
term interests of a district population by ensuring the
stability and survival of providers. The district health
authority purchasers who controlled the largest share
of resources were unable to ignore the interests of the
district hospitals on which their population relied.
The 1997 changes to National Health Service (NHS)
structures seem to have recognized that the
purchasing role needed changing, and relocated that
role to primary care groups accountable to district
health authorities, in which general practitioners
(GPs), community nurses, and other interested
parties participate. The creation of primary care
groups may prove an important, albeit unintended,
mechanism for strengthening competitive pressures.
The 1991 reforms did not fundamentally
change reimbursement procedures at the primary
level. GPs, for example, have always been indepen-
dent (private), and yet have been largely publicly
financed since 1948. The major change brought
about by the 1991 reforms was to offer GPs the
opportunity to replace the district health authority in
purchasing certain hospital services. Those who did
so became ‘‘fund-holding GPs’’. Because they
purchased on a smaller scale than district authorities,
they did not face the same constraints. For example,
they could move contracts from one hospital to
another without significantly affecting hospital
viability. As a result, what competition emerged was
forGP contracts. There were allegations that patients
funded by GP contracts received preferential treat-
ment, including prioritization onwaiting lists (34, 35).
Colombia. In Colombia, a classic tripartite
health system operated up to 1996. The reforms
seem to have had three overriding objectives: to
increase the solidarity of the health system by
merging public and social security subsectors; to
introduce competition; and to introduce a contract-
ing environmentwithin a public health framework. In
pursuit of the first objective, public health budgets
were redirected to subsidize social insurance for
those sections of the population judged to be unable
to pay (according to a near-universal household
survey). This constitutes the ‘‘subsidized regimen’’ of
the system.
To introduce competition on both provision
and purchasing sides, health promotion enterprises
(EPSs) were formed. The EPSs offered packages of
care for the insured, under both subsidized and
contributory regimens, by contracting with provi-
ders. The EPSs are private enterprises, which may or
may not be for-profit and are sometimes community-
based organizations. The latter, in particular, have
competed for members of the subsidized regimen.
This contract arrangement replaced integrated ar-
rangements in both public and social security sectors.
Even though both purchasers and providers
are essentially private, several factors move the
system in a public health direction. First, extensive
regulations set detailed rules of operation. Second,
the market power of public funds flowing through
the system can be leveraged. And finally, an
‘‘equalization mechanism’’ can enforce solidarity
despite the proliferation of EPSs. Important rules
of operation for the market include the following: a
minimum package of care which all EPSs must offer;
setting contribution and EPS reimbursement levels,
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for both contributory and subsidized regimens; and
mandating a cross-subsidy from the contributory to
the subsidized regimen. Over time, the plan is to
equalize packages of care in the subsidized and
contributory regimens.
Implementation of the reforms has required
that public hospitals switch, with little preparation,
from an integrated to a contract mode of operation,
and from a budgeted financing system to one which
bills different EPSs for services received by their
members. Ensuring compliance with compulsory
contributions by the self-employed is proving
difficult, and planned flows of finance around the
system have not always been realized. This has
created windfall surpluses in someEPSs and financial
crisis in other hospitals, despite a hugely increased
volume of financing to the system as a whole. Within
the contributory regimen, subscriptions (the bulk of
which are still gathered by employers) have not
always been transferred according to the wishes of
employees. This contributes to ‘‘persistence’’, the
tendency of the insured to stay in one fund despite
freedom of choice to move to another (36, 37), but
other causes may also apply. For example, those who
change funds must incur transition and information
costs, often including the need to change providers
and establish new relationships and clinical histories.
Perhaps for similar reasons, many of those who are
newly entitled to insurance benefits do not actively
select an EPS and continue to seek care in the public
hospitals they have always used (38).
Zambia. In Zambia a purchasing agency, the
Central Board of Health, has been set up at central
level, separate from the Ministry of Health, but
conceived of as the Ministry’s ‘‘implementing
agency’’. The Board agrees contracts with districts
and purchases services from them for primary level
and district hospitals. It also contracts for services
directly with secondary and tertiary hospitals, which
are now governed by hospital management boards,
rather than by the Ministry. The Board also agrees
contracts with nongovernmental hospitals and will
shortly develop contracts with two hospitals pre-
viously owned by Zambia Consolidated Copper
Mines, which are being divested as part of the
privatization programme.
A number of problems have arisen, some because
the reform package has been only partially legislated
and ratified. According to a financing policy agreed
by committee, but not yet ratified, the Central Board
of Health should purchase a ‘‘basic package of care’’
and full cost-recovery fees should be charged for
services outside the basic package. The basic package
has been agreed upon for the district level, but is still
under discussion for secondary and tertiary hospitals.
The autonomy of hospital management boards has
been heavily circumscribed by direct ministerial
intervention, under a minister whose commitment
to the reform programmewas strongly doubted. This
minister has recently been replaced and this may
permit these problems to be addressed.
Other problems arise from what might be seen
as an inadequately ambitious reform design. Con-
tracts do not directly pay for service, but rather pay on
the basis of agreed budgets and agreed outputs —
similar to a ‘‘block contract’’. For example, secondary
and tertiary hospital financing is based on the number
of approved beds in each hospital, rather than on the
volume of activity. Difficulties in effectively mon-
itoring activity levels seem to preclude more
sophisticated contract forms, but without these, it
can be assumed that central financing is independent
of performance by districts and hospitals, and there is
little leverage exercised by the contracts themselves.
What leverage might be implied by the reporting
requirements of the contracts, which should demon-
strate that agreed services have in fact been delivered,
is undermined by the usual government failure to pay
the full agreed budget because of revenue shortfalls.
It is also not surprising that hospitals prefer to
generate user charge revenue, irrespective of its
effects on the core patient business intended to be
subsidized by the Central Board of Health. In
particular, it has been alleged that hospitals are
redirecting resources into ‘‘high-cost’’ wards and
other services which attract ‘‘cost-recovery’’ fees.
More positively, there has been progress in the
development of a management information system.
Financial reporting and hospital and district planning
have clearly been developed in response to the
reform agenda, and might not have met with the
same success in the absence of the imperatives of the
reformed system.
Finally, the performance of the reform pro-
gramme cannot be judged without an understanding
of the overall financial crisis of the health sector.
Delays in the mine privatization programme ensured
that the long-term declines in copper revenues have
not been reversed, despite some rallying in the price
of copper — the Zambian government’s principal
source of revenue. Following the introduction of
health reforms, health sector revenues suffered
substantial real cuts and the need to take over two
of the mining company’s hospitals, in towns which
have no other facility, will spread resources still more
thinly (39).
Conclusions. Maynard & Bloor’s distinction
between ‘‘regulated competition’’ and ‘‘managed
competition’’ is useful in contrasting the Colombian
and United Kingdom reform programmes (40). The
authors define regulated competition as ‘‘competi-
tion on the supply side only, with maintenance of a
single source of public finance’’ and managed
competition as ‘‘competition on both the supply
and funding (demand) sides of the market’’. Accord-
ing to these definitions, theUnitedKingdom reforms
introduced regulated competition, whereas the
Colombian reforms introducemanaged competition.
In Zambia, there is no competition on either side, but
rather a system of public contracting. The common
component in all three countries was the introduction
of public sector contracts.
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The three cases illustrate the general argument
that it is difficult to achieve the theoretical advantages
of contracting. In the United Kingdom, for example,
competition was not absent, yet competitive forces
were muted and perverse incentives arose to
prioritize marginal business. In Colombia, the issue
of ‘‘persistence’’, or perhaps the absence of genuine
choice of insurer, may have been the most important
block to competitive forces. In Zambia, reform
design did not introduce any competitive forces.
Other issues are likely to emerge as implementation
proceeds.
Success in imposing a publicly set framework
for health providers has also beenmixed. In theUnited
Kingdom, purchasing was constrained by the mono-
psonist character of district health authorities and it
remains to be seen whether the switch to primary care
groups will allow stronger public purchasing. In
Colombia, the publicly set framework involved a
regulatory rather than purchasing role. The failure to
enforce regulations is already apparent, a predictable
issue given the difficulties of regulation and the limited
extent of public sector capacity. In Zambia, several
missed opportunities for reform imply a failure to
impose a public agenda on provider institutions.
Besides adequate public sector capacity, the ability to
impose a publicly set agenda also appears to require
adequate funding of reforms. Using contracts as the
basis of purchaser–provider relationships appears
more costly than direct management (33, 41) In both
Colombia and the United Kingdom, reform was
accompanied by increased financing, whereas in
Zambia continued decline prevented the effective
imposition of the public agenda. Provider institutions
who have not received agreed payments do not feel
bound by contract agreements, and pursue alternative
incentives provided by ‘‘private’’ patients.
The use of contracts to stimulate improvement
of management systems is the most convincing
rationale for contracting policy, and the evidence
above supports this argument. Improved manage-
ment information systems are apparent in all three
countries and the reforms seem at least partially
responsible.
Contracts between public and private
sectors for support services
Far more common than the wholesale adoption of a
contracting framework at the systems level has been
the partial use of contracts to resolve specific
subsector problems. A study of the implementation
of ‘‘new public management’’ approaches in Ghana,
India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, countries
at different levels of development, provides an
opportunity to compare the problems faced by this
approach in different types of countries (24). Since
the nature of contracts and the difficulties they face
are substantially different, depending on the nature of
the service contracted for (42), the discussion here is
confined to contracts for hospital-support services,
such as catering and cleaning.
Ghana. Ghana had had a long-standing
experience of agreements with church providers,
but had made little progress in contracting out
support services, despite intentions to do so (43).
Ministry of Health staff lacked the skills and
experience to design contracts, and there was
concern that the proposals would encounter strong
staff and union opposition. In addition, the level of
private sector development was a serious constraint,
with few firms available or willing to take on
government contracts. Moreover, private sector
wages were higher and limited the scope for the
contracted service to be less costly.
Zimbabwe. In contrast, in recent years Zim-
babwe has managed both to plan and implement a
policy for contracting support services in the main
hospitals (24, 44). Key factors which helped to
account for this include the following: a carefully
planned process of capacity building among Ministry
of Health staff; arrangements to help affected staff
either get jobs with the contractors or set up their
own companies to bid for contracts; strong Cabinet
backing for the policy; a more developed private
sector with greater capacity to tender for contracts;
and a contracting process which encouraged private
sector bids for what might be regarded as a risky
venture.
India and Sri Lanka.Both India and Sri Lanka
had widespread contracting of support services such
as catering and cleaning, especially in the larger cities
(45–47). In contrast to Africa, availability of private
sector suppliers was not amajor problem; neither was
the level of costs in the private sector; nor was the
ability of the government administration to design
andmanage contracts. However, neither country had
a national policy for contracting, and contracting
arrangements were on an ad hoc basis. Constraints to
greater use of contracts were more political than
administrative. In both India and Sri Lanka a clear
constraint was the inability to retrench public sector
workers and address the power of the public service
unions in dictating employment terms and condi-
tions. Hence institutional factors, and especially the
long-standing influence of a dominant public-sector
ideology, were major barriers. In addition, although
private-sector capacity existed to take on contracts,
there were concerns that markets were not very
competitive, both because of action by suppliers to
limit competition, and because government prices
and procedures discouraged substantial numbers of
bidders.
Thailand. Thailand had quite extensive con-
tracting of support services, carried out as a hospital
initiative within strict central regulations (48). As part
of the plans to restrict the growth of the civil service,
contracting outwaswidely encouraged and regulations
were relaxed. The level of private sector development
also permitted extensive contracting. In contrast, there
were problems on the government side, with regula-
tions that did not encourage sufficient competition for
contracts, or leverage government purchasing power
to obtain favourable terms.
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This brief summary highlights the extent to
which progress and problems were dependent on
some key country features. Government skills and
experience were constraints in the African context,
where Ministries of Health had not been accustomed
to managing contractual relationships for services.
However, the experience in Zimbabwe demon-
strated that such constraints can be addressed though
efforts to increase skills and provide relevant
experience; also skills can be developed ‘‘on the
job’’. More fundamental constraints to successful
contracting out were external to the Ministry and
included: unreformed and centralized bureaucratic
systems that did not provide flexibility in how
contracts were specified and managed, or give
managers much authority or responsibility; an
inability to address the labour implications of
contracting; and a lack of political backing to pursue
courses unpopular with public sector workers. A
contrast can be drawn with the United Kingdom,
where a government-wide policy of contracting out
was implemented in the 1980s (prior to the specific
health sector reforms discussed above). Factors
influencing its success included concurrent legisla-
tion which weakened the power of organized labour,
and the low status of unskilled service workers.
Public sector workers in developing countries, in
contrast, are generally in a more privileged position.
However, the context and capacity of the
purchaser only partly explain the different progress
between the countries. Equally important was the
degree of development of the private sector, and
especially the extent to which market relationships
predominated. Market-based relationships, such as
those which emphasize competition, imply very
different sorts of interactions (49): competitive
bidding requires firms who do not coordinate with
each other over the bidding process; there should be
no exchange of gifts in the bidding process between
governments and providers; and monitoring of
contracts needs to be backed by law. Changing the
nature of the relationships between purchasers and
providers is likely to be a long-term process.
Towards improving comparative
analysis of health sector reform
This article has focused on public and private roles in
the health sector, in order to explore the process of
international health reform in a specific context. A
comparison of the conclusions suggest that a few are
generalizable, while others are highly specific. How-
ever, most of the useful output from the review can
be classified as ‘‘categorizable conclusions’’: in
different circumstances, different outcomes can be
predicted from similar policies. This is not a very
surprising finding, and indeed echoes the views of
Rose and Marmor (1, 2). We have argued that as
international comparative research accumulates,
models of the relationships between policy variables
and outcomes are constructed and amended. These
models facilitate comprehension of critical variables
that influence policy outcomes. In doing so, they
suggest a framework for the comparison of countries
and their health systems, and the similarity of
experience and outcome with health sector reforms
can be predicted.
However, little guidance is available to coun-
tries that would enable them to distinguish between
instructive andmisleading reform experiences. There
is a considerable literature on the comparative
analysis of health systems (e.g. see review 50), but it
is too broad to enable a focused enquiry into the
relevance and transferability of reform experiences.
In most of this work, too, developing countries have
been excluded, or included only as an afterthought
(51). This has led most thinking on the subject to be
largely intuitive. It is usually the case, for example,
that discussions of international health sector reform
consider either ‘‘industrialized’’ or ‘‘developing’’
countries; and on rare occasions, conclusions from
such discussions are categorized along the dimension
of development. For example, The World Bank’s
World development report 1993 (52) included a table in
which the policy implications were categorized for
countries at three different levels of development.
The conclusions from our review of public–
private issues support the view that development
levels are important when making comparisons of
reform experience. Other important factors are given
in Table 1. Many of these variables will be correlated
with indicators of development. However, others are
not very closely correlated (e.g. the culture of market
relationships), and some not at all (e.g. labour market
disequilibria). Together they enable a more specific
interpretation of the vague concept ‘‘level of
development’’ for those seeking guidance for inter-
national health sector reform.
Perhaps more importantly, frameworks such as
those developed in Table 1 permit a more sophisti-
cated use of experiences with international health
Table 1. Important dimensions of health systems emerging
from a review of the public and private health sectors
Role of private providers Use of contracts
Demand factors Income levels
Size of middle class
Population density
Purchasing power of the
public sector
Supply factors Human resources (especially
the supply of doctors)
Level of private sector
development
Institutional structures
Extent of competition/
contestability
Level of private sector
development
Strength of public
sector
Extensiveness of the care
package in the public sector
Public sector capacity
(especially in regulation)
Design–legislation–implemen-
tation–review–design process
Public sector capacity (espe-
cially in monitoring, negotia-
tion and prompt payment)
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sector reform that extends beyond considerations of
transferability, per se. Using such frameworks and
models that predict the importance of included
variables, it is possible to propose mechanisms
through which policy affects outcomes and identify
potential constraints to desired outcomes. Hence,
appropriate preparatory and contemporaneous mea-
sures can be developed and form part of a well-
designed health reform package. It is here that
international comparative research is likely to bemost
useful.
In this article we have attempted to provide the
first steps in a process that we believe could enable a
more coherent approach to international ‘‘lesson
drawing’’ in health sector reform than is possible at
present. The gap between the status quo and a
coherent and comprehensive framework is consider-
able, but we believe that efforts to close it are well
worthwhile. n
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Re´sume´
Enseignements a` tirer des comparaisons internationales entre syste`mes de sante´
et re´formes de ces syste`mes
Il est rare de pouvoir ge´ne´raliser a` d’autres pays, au
moyen de comparaisons internationales, les enseigne-
ments tire´s de la re´forme du secteur sanitaire d’un pays
donne´ : la spe´cificite´ est si grande qu’on ne pourra retenir
au mieux ces enseignements que dans un contexte
pre´cis. Le plus souvent, cet exercice devra se limiter aux
pays semblables et de´pendra de l’existence de mode`les
sous-jacents des processus de re´forme et de la
compre´hension de leur impact sur les objectifs politiques.
Toutefois, une ge´ne´ralisation limite´e et, plus largement,
une comparaison internationale des re´formes de la
sante´, ne´cessite un cadre empirique pour de´terminer si
les pays sont « plus semblables » ou « moins sembla-
bles ». Le proce´de´ que nous proposons dans cet article
e´tablit ce cadre a` partir d’une se´rie d’actions politiques
individuelles, de leurs re´sultats dans diverses situations
et des causes et effets probables qui entrent en jeu. Prises
individuellement, les politiques ont des dimensions
sanitaires qui se recoupent largement. Nous avons
suppose´ qu’il s’agissait la` de facteurs de similarite´, bien
que ce dernier point ne puisse eˆtre confirme´ qu’a` la fin du
processus que nous abordons dans cet article.
Nous e´tudions les faits en rapport avec la
« comple´mentarite´ entre le secteur public et le secteur
prive´ » pour les soins de sante´ et proposons un cadre
pre´liminaire permettant aux pays de classer leur syste`me
de sante´. Nous pensons que plusieurs facteurs, lie´s au
de´veloppement du pays, influent sur l’existence des
prestateurs prive´s : niveau des revenus, importance de la
classe moyenne, prestations sanitaires du secteur public,
capacite´ de celui-ci a` mener a` bien des activite´s de
re´glementation et de surveillance et a` ne´gocier avec le
secteur prive´, niveau de de´veloppement du secteur prive´
(en dehors de la sante´), niveau de formation. Il y a
e´galement d’autres facteurs, inde´pendants du niveau de
de´veloppement, comme le nombre de me´decins et les
structures institutionnelles du secteur public re´sultant
des « facteurs interde´pendants ».
L’examen des re´sultats des prestateurs prive´s fait
apparaıˆtre une conclusion : si le secteur prive´ peut
comple´ter les prestations assure´es par le secteur public, il
ne peut optimiser la contribution de ce dernier a` l’e´tat de
sante´ ge´ne´ral de la population. Cela signifie qu’il
convient d’accorder une plus grande confiance aux
mode`les de re´formes qui renforcent l’autorite´ publique
dans ce secteur. L’instauration d’un cadre contractuel
autour de cette autorite´ a constitue´ un mode`le puissant a`
l’origine de changements dans de nombreux pays.
Quelques-uns dont la Colombie, le Royaume-Uni et la
Zambie ont adopte´ ce principe pour l’ensemble de leur
syste`me de sante´ mais, en re`gle ge´ne´rale, les pays l’ont
applique´ au coup par coup, passant des contrats pour
certains services lorsque cela semblait avantageux.
L’examen des travaux de recherche a fait
apparaıˆtre des parame`tres pouvant influer sur la mise
en œuvre du mode`le dans diffe´rents pays : variables
de´terminant la mesure dans laquelle la loi de la
concurrence se fait ressentir ; tendances du financement
du secteur public pendant la pe´riode de mise en place de
la re´forme ; investissements dans le secteur public ;
souplesse des syste`mes bureaucratiques ; pouvoir des
syndicats dans le secteur public ; caracte´ristiques
culturelles des relations avec le marche´. Il est possible
de regrouper les parame`tres susceptibles d’influer sur
l’engagement prive´ dans le secteur public de la sante´ en
« facteurs lie´s a` la demande », « facteurs lie´s a` l’offre » et
« force du secteur public » (voir Tableau 1). Selon nous,
ces e´le´ments peuvent servir a` e´tablir un cadre de
comparaison internationale des syste`mes de sante´ et a`
ame´liorer ainsi les informations mises a` la disposition des
pays envisageant de re´former leur secteur de la sante´.
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Resumen
¿Que´ lecciones cabe extaer de las comparaciones internacionales de los sistemas
de salud y de las reformas de los mismos?
Las lecciones que pueden extraerse de las comparaciones
internacionales de los sistemas de salud y de las reformas
de los mismos rara vez pueden generalizarse de un paı´s a
otro o, en el mejor de los casos, son tan especı´ficas que
so´lo pueden aplicarse en un determinado contexto. En la
mayorı´a de los casos las conclusiones se pueden
generalizar de forma limitada a paı´ses similares. Esas
generalizaciones limitadas son posibles cuando existen
modelos de los procesos de reforma y se comprenden las
repercusiones en los objetivos de polı´tica. Sin embargo,
toda generalizacio´n limitada, y en general toda
comparacio´n de reformas sanitarias a nivel internacional,
requiere un marco empı´rico que permita determinar el
grado de similitud de los paı´ses. En este artı´culo
proponemos un procedimiento para crear un marco de
esa naturaleza a partir de una serie de polı´ticas
concretas, de su desempen˜o en diferentes contextos, y
de las causas y los efectos probablemente implicados.
Probablemente se dara´n coincidencias entre los distintos
marcos a medida que se evalu´en nuevas polı´ticas, pero
eso so´lo podra´ confirmarse al final del proceso iniciado
con este artı´culo.
Hemos analizado las pruebas cientı´ficas disponi-
bles sobre la atencio´n sanitaria «mixta pu´blica-privada»,
y proponemos un marco preliminar mediante el que los
paı´ses podrı´an clasificar sus sistemas de salud.
Sugerimos que el desarrollo de los proveedores privados
se ve influido por varios factores asociados al nivel de
desarrollo de un paı´s. Entre esos factores cabe citar los
siguientes: nivel de ingresos; taman˜o de la clase media;
prestaciones de atencio´n sanitaria por el sector pu´blico;
capacidad del sector pu´blico para llevar a cabo
actividades de reglamentacio´n y vigilancia y para
negociar con el sector privado; nivel de desarrollo del
sector privado (no sanitario); y nivel de educacio´n. Otros
factores no tienen por que´ estar correlacionados con el
nivel de desarrollo, entre ellos el suministro de me´dicos y
las estructuras institucionales del sector de la salud
resultantes de la «dependencia diacro´nica».
Una conclusio´n se desprende del ana´lisis de los
datos sobre el desempen˜o de los proveedores privados, y
es que, si bien puede complementar la prestacio´n pu´blica
de salud, el sector privado no puede maximizar su
contribucio´n a la salud de la poblacio´n. Eso hace pensar
que habrı´a que tener ma´s confianza en los modelos de
reforma que refuerzan el liderazgo pu´blico del sector. Un
modelo poderoso que ha influido en los cambios en
muchos paı´ses situ´a el liderazgo pu´blico en el interior de
un marco contractual. Algunos paı´ses, como Colombia,
el Reino Unido y Zambia, han aplicado ese principio en
todo el sistema de salud, pero la mayorı´a lo han aplicado
de manera poco sistema´tica, subcontratando servicios
cuando ello parecı´a ventajoso.
Analizando las actividades de investigacio´n se
identificaron tambie´n diversas variables que pueden
influir en la aplicacio´n del modelo en diferentes paı´ses.
Entre ellas cabe citar las siguientes: variables que
influyen en el grado de manifestacio´n de las fuerzas
competitivas; tendencias de las finanzas del sector
pu´blico durante el periodo de implantacio´n de las
reformas; inversio´n en el sector pu´blico; flexibilidad de
los sistemas burocra´ticos; poder de las organizaciones de
trabajadores en el sector pu´blico; y aspectos culturales de
las relaciones de mercado. Las variables con influencia
potencial en la implicacio´n del sector privado en el sector
pu´blico de la salud pueden clasificarse en «factores de
demanda», «factores de oferta» y «poder del sector
pu´blico» (ve´ase la tabla 1). Creemos que es posible
emplear esos componentes en un marco de comparacio´n
de los sistemas de salud internacionales, y que dicho
marco podrı´a mejorar la informacio´n disponible en los
paı´ses que preve´n reformar sus sectores sanitarios.
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